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Setting the stage: Constitutional Plots, Characters and Stakes
In the judgment of 18th of April 2018 of the logging case (C – 441/17) the Court of Justice
(„the Court”) ruled (unsurprisingly) that by carrying on logging activities on the NATURA
2000 site, the UNESCO-protected Białowieża Forest, Poland has failed to fulfil its
obligations under EU law. For any student of EU law the case might look like a simple one
that on the day of its resolution would join hundreds of infringement cases heard and
decided by the Court every year. However, this prima facie simple case belongs to the
annals of the European jurisprudence for three reasons other than the judgment itself. First,
for its unprecedented circumstances and procedural twists and turns that preceded the
ruling on the merits. Second, the courts can only do so much without the active support of
the political institutions and this case teaches us a painful lesson about the limits of the
courtroom when such support is lacking. Third, it shows that the Treaties do contain legal
tools to respond to the recalcitrant member states riding roughshod over the core values
and principles of the EU legal order. For that to happen however, political will to stand up
for the EU essentials must go hand in hand with the imaginative judicial interpretation(s).
When the former is missing, the latter loses all its deterrent effect.
Act One. „Hope, Purpose and Resistance”
In C – 441/17R the Commission asked the Court, pending the judgment in the main
proceedings, to order Poland to cease, except where there is a threat to public safety, the
active forest management operations, including, inter alia, the removal of centuries-old
dead spruces and the felling of trees as part of increased logging in the Białowieża Forest.
By order of 27th July 2017, the Vice-President of the Court provisionally granted that
request pending the adoption of an order terminating the proceedings for interim measures.
Despite the provisional order, the logging not only continued but intensified. In an act of
defiance unprecedented in the history of European integration, Poland openly rejected the
order and refused to stop logging. As a result huge chunks of the forest are gone forever
(for full scale of devastation see the report here that shows the scope of logging activities
after the Court has issued its first order). The paranoid politics of resentment reached its
peak when Poland asked for the removal of Białowieza from the UNESCO World Heritage
list! How would the court respond to this? The answer was unequivocal and strong: with its
own logic and language of the “new legal order” – the rule of law, effet utile and credibility
of commitments voluntarily accepted at the Accession.
On November 20, 2017, the Court sitting as the Grand Chamber (which in itself is unheard
of in the interim proceedings) decided the case. The Court responded forcefully that
article 279 TFEU must be interpreted as conferring on the Court the power to prescribe any
interim measures that it deems necessary in order to ensure that the final decision is fully
effective. In the Court’s own words:
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[…] once the matter is before it, the Court hearing the application for interim measures must
satisfy itself that the measures that it is minded to order are sufficiently effective to achieve
their aim. It is specifically for that purpose that Article 279 TFEU grants the Court a broad
discretion, in the exercise of which it is empowered, inter alia, having regard to the
circumstances of each case, to specify the subject matter and the scope of the interim measures
requested, and also, if it deems appropriate, to adopt, where necessary of its own motion, any
ancillary measure intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the interim measures that it orders
(para 99)
The part „once the matter is before the Court” is both a powerful reminder of the logic of the
courtroom, and serves as a message sent to the politics of resentment. The command to
ensure the observance of the „law” empowers the Court to interpret a specific jurisdictional
attribution (in this case Article 279 TFEU) accordingly. Respect for the „law” means that the
Court must be able to ensure the effectiveness of an order directed at a party pursuant to
Article 279 TFEU, by adopting any measure intended to ensure that the interim order is
complied with by that party. Such a measure may entail, among others, a periodic penalty
payment to be imposed in case the relevant party does not respect that order.
Then, in the two most consequential paragraphs 101-102, the Court finally met the politics
of resentment head-on. The Polish government argued that only Article 260 TFEU
empowers the Court to impose sanctions on the Member States. Poland’s interpretation of
this provision was that it is first for the Commission to bring an action for failure to fulfil
obligations pursuant to Article 258 TFEU and it is only if the Court upholds that action and
Poland fails to comply with the Court’s decision that the Commission will then be entitled to
bring an action pursuant to Article 260 TFEU. Clearly, the Court was less than impressed.
In response to this line of argument, it stressed first that a periodic penalty payment cannot,
in the circumstances of the present case, be seen as a punishment. Second, the Republic
of Poland’s interpretation of the system of legal remedies under EU law in general, and of
proceedings for interim measures in particular, would have the effect of considerably
reducing the likelihood of those proceedings achieving their objectives. Allowing Poland’s
argument to stand would be tantamount to sanctioning impunity and letting the rogue
government dictate the rules of the game. It is for the court, and not for political
instrumentalisation and expediency, to dictate the rules of the game.
In para 102 of the order, the Court left no doubt that:
The purpose of seeking to ensure that a Member State complies with interim measures
adopted by the Court hearing an application for such measures by providing for the imposition
of a periodic penalty payment in the event of non-compliance with those measures is to
guarantee the effective application of EU law, such application being an essential component
of the rule of law, a value enshrined in Article 2 TEU and on which the European Union is
founded
In the light of the circumstances of the case, the Court found it necessary to bolster the
effectiveness of the interim measures granted by providing for penalty payments to be
imposed if Poland fails to comply immediately and fully with the interim measures. The
objective of the penalty is to discourage Poland from delaying its compliance with the
Court’s order. To that end, the Court ordered Poland to send to the Commission, within 15
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days of notification of the order, details of all measures that it has adopted in order to
comply fully, and to justify those active forest management operations at issue that it
intends to continue because they are necessary to ensure public safety. If the Commission
is of the view that Poland has failed to comply fully with the order, it will be able to request
that proceedings be resumed. The Court would then decide, by way of a new order,
whether the initial order has been infringed. Should such infringement be found, the Court
will order Poland to pay to the Commission a penalty payment of at least € 100,000 per
day, from the date of notification of the initial order to Poland until Poland complies with the
Court’s order or until final judgment in the case is delivered.
Now on to the Act Two.
Act Two: „Strategic player”
Kim Lane Scheppele has already shown how the approach of the Commission must
change in response to the Member States’ blatant undermining of the foundations of the
EU law. Her bold proposition of systemic infringement actions against the member states
that violate core values of the EU is based on two assumptions. First, that the Court will be
able to recalibrate its mandate and reinterpret its jurisdiction. Second, that the Commission
will be up to the challenge of interpreting its role in the infringement actions as both the
supplicant, and enforcer. Shift towards systemic infringement actions calls for strategic
reading of the Treaties. „Strategic" means that a political actor puts a premium not only on
words, but also on actual actions. This confirms M. Shapiro’s argument that „in the realm of
judicial behaviour, what judges say, what rules they announce and/or threaten to announce
is often a more significant aspect of their behaviour than how they vote” (Can Judges
Deliberate?, Third Annual Walter W. Murphy Lecture in American Constitutionalism,
Princeton University, 29 April 2003, p. 3 – paper on file with the Author).
The Court as a political player and actor must absorb the legal change around it and
accommodate its case law accordingly. The „logging case” is one such example of judicial
accommodation.
Act Three: „Strategic Constitution: When text meets context”
The error of „normative asymmetry” (authority to ensure that Member States remain liberal
democracies has not been translated into law yet) becomes less acute when the Treaties
are read in a strategic fashion. Systemic violations call for systemic responses. The
guardians of the legal order must not let the Treaty („text”) be abused by a rogue
government. Enforcement must build the „context”. Art. 19 TEU clearly mandates the Court
to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. My
claim is that unfulfilled potential lies in the constructive interpretation of the text in the light
of the foundational 1963 judgment of the Court in Van Gend en Loos. What matters is the
„the spirit and the general scheme of the Treaty", rather than formalist reading of one legal
provision in isolation. The Białowieża case shows that there are legal avenues to pursue
before wringing our hands in despair and accepting that nothing can be done. The text is
there and there exist institutions to interpret and enforce it. What is needed (and missing) is
the political will to make the core principles of the EU law fully operative and respected.
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Legal order of the EU depends on the Member States’ continuing compliance with the EU
laws. Deliberate refusal of a member state to implement EU law is a failure in their duty of
solidarity that strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community legal order”. The same
must go for a refusal to follow the decision of the Court.
In Commission v Italy the Court held, as if almost anticipating the politics of resentment:
"In permitting Member States to profit from the advantages of the Community, the Treaty
imposes on them also the obligation to respect its rules.For a State unilaterally to break,
according to its own conception of national interest, the equilibrium between advantages and
obligations flowing from its adherence to the Community brings into question the equality of
Member States before Community law and creates discriminations at the expense of their
nationals, and above all of the nationals of the State itself which places itself outside the
Community rules.” (para 24).
The Court continued and added:
„This failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by the fact of their adherence
to the Community strikes at the fundamental basis of the Community legal order.” (at para
25).
When read in this light, the Białowieża Forest case starts a new „existential jurisprudence”
and tailors it to the present dangers coming in the wake of the rule of law crisis. Clearly the
court-room must not be seen as a problem solver in all circumstances, yet it might offer one
powerful mechanism against „exit”. The Court has been always recognized as a powerful
political player that is capable of casting its judicial shadow on all the actors in the EU
governance. One of the great strengths of a judicial power wielded by a court like the Court
of Justice is incrementalism. It both shields the actor, and expands its authority. The Court
– political player proceeds incrementally and must be aware of both the opportunities and
limitations along the way. The qualification „incremental” is crucial here because “[…] the
core of incremental doctrine is respect for the status quo and movement from the status
quo only in short, marginal steps carefully designed to allow for further modifications in the
light of further developments […] Incrementalism is a theory of freedom and limitation” (M.
Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or stare decisis,
(1965) Law in Transition Quarterly Vol. II No. 3 pp. 156-157). However, the judicialization of
the EU governance must be understood as a joint enterprise. The Court never functions in
a legal vacuum.
This is where Act Four starts.
Act Four: „The Commission is Missing in Action … Again”
The study of impact of any supreme court must go beyond the analysis of „what a court has
said”. Therefore, I wish to follow Martin Shapiro’s typology of what he calls varieties of
impact studies (The Supreme Court speaks … and what happens? The Impact of the
Supreme Court, (1971) 23 Journal of Legal Education 77). According to him, an analysis
shall, inter alia, focus on „the whole institutional role of the supreme court and its whole
pattern of commands and statements”.
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The times of constitutional crisis call for more robust approach to institutions, and their
respective spheres of competence and expertise. In the spirit of comparative approach to
institutions we must look more attentively at the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
institution, and then decide who does what best. The courts of law are in the business of
enforcing the rule of law and this this is what they do, and this is what they do best. Of
course it does not mean that they are the only players in the rule of law domain. There are
other institutions who have their own distinct mandate and competences. Sometimes for an
action by one player to be fully effective, a follow-up will be needed. In other situations, a
judicial actor will be able to bring about a change through its actions only.
The logging case belongs the former category. Agreeing with the centrality of the question
“the court decides, but what happens next?”, the follow-up to the Court’s valiant attempt to
defend the integrity of the EU legal order in the Białowieża case must be considered as the
most disappointing. The Court threw the Commission a lifeline, and the Commission
inexplicably stopped short of applying for the penalties, and never delivered on the
constitutional promises of the Court’s order. The lack of the political will to enforce the text
(Act Three) has been deafening. In the Białowieża case the process of judicialization of the
EU governance called for a concerted action and dual commitments: from the Court and the
Commission. The Court did its part, Commission failed and reverted to its bad ways from
the past: negotiating with the government who has been giving short shrift to the
Commission and to the core values of the EU law for two years and will continue doing that
under the pretense of striving for a compromise with the EU. The Commission continues to
be missing one crucial element: the politics of resentment are not just one-off aberration. It
is a constitutional doctrine with the overarching constitutional themes, plots and characters.
The repeated denouncement by the Polish ruling party of the Court’s jurisdiction did not
come out of the blue. Rejection of supranational institutions is one of the core elements of
the politics of resentment. The Białowieża case shows how this anti-institutional animus is
now being extended from the domestic sphere (capture of the Constitutional Court and the
judiciary) to the European.
The capture enters a new phase: welcome to the tragedy’s Act Five.
Act Five: „From ‘The Exit in Values’ to ‘The Exit in Legality’
The „exit in values” that has already happened in Poland has now been complemented by
“the exit in legality” at the supranational level. No longer is the government seeking to
remove itself from the liberal values and norms. It is now also seeking to separate itself
legally from the institutions that supervise the respect for these values and norms. At the
domestic level, the legality oversight has been removed when the Constitutional Court was
destroyed. Now, the time has come to break free from the supranational machinery of
control and enforcement. Following the trajectory from the “exit in values” to the “exit in
legality” reveals an inescapable logic. All institutions, domestic and supranational, are seen
to be standing in the way, and their rejection is part of the comprehensive constitutional
doctrine – the politics of resentment. Failure to stop the politics of resentment now only
emboldens the doctrine and the people behind it. We have already seen how the passivity
and indecisiveness of the Commission in 2015 – 2017 has empowered the Polish politics of
resentment. What started as a capture of the constitutional review was soon transformed
5/6
into an assault on all independent institutions in the country. While the Commission was
watching, the capture only gained strength coming from the conviction that Europe will do
nothing to stop it. Soon after the Constitutional Court, the politics of resentment claimed
new victims – media, Supreme Court, ordinary courts, National Council of the Judiciary.
The list goes on … Add now to it the Court of Justice.
Final Act. „From Hope to Despair: Going Beyond Lawyers’
Heads”
The preceding analysis came from the lawyer. Now, for a moment, a citizen in me must
speak out. There is one aspect of all this that we must never forget about.
There used to be the last European primeval forest in Poland.
And then the politics of resentment descended.
The pictures of deforestation show what has happened to large chunks of the Białowieża
Forest. It must remain the lasting image of the failure of the European governance. While
talking to the Polish government (or any Member State for that matter) is always a positive
thing in the community of equal states, there has been too much empty dialoguing,
extending deadlines and hoping that the change of heart will come after all in the „Polish
case”. If anything, Europe has excelled in talking the talk rather than walking the walk. One
can suspect (and suspicion is all we are left with as the Commission never addressed the
burning question why it stopped short of applying for penalties when faced with the
continued logging) that the Commission’s silence has been predicated on the counter-
factual assumption that a face-saving trade-off might be in the making along the lines of
Commission’s easing down on the interim injunction on the one hand, and Poland
backtracking on some of the „reforms” on the other. If this was indeed the reason for the
Commission’s inaction in the case, then it would be yet another example of a rotten
compromise that sacrifices the constitutional essentials for short-term (and hypothetical, to
say the least) political gains.
Yet, the significance of Białowieża Forest case goes beyond here and now. The price to be
paid for the institutional impotence and naivety will be much higher than in the case of
captured institutions. While the latter might be rebuilt, the unique forest will be soon gone
forever. A very high price indeed for institutional opportunism and short-sighted politics of
the now discredited „guardian of the Treaties”.
If the destruction of the Białowieża Forest has not been enough to awaken EU, may be
nothing ever will. And that might be the long-lasting and tragic legacy of the the tragedy that
played out in the Białowieża Forest and then in Luxembourg …
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